SOCIAl SECURITY IN TURKISH MIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Social security plays an important role in any society, in any life. Everybody is dependent on the care of others during his or her first years of life. Likewise, most people need to be supported in their old age. In addition, people can be thrown back upon the aid of others as a result of, for instance, a crop failure, unemployment, invalidity, or the death of a breadwinner. Social security prevents people who are unable to support themselves from being subjected to a severe worsening of living conditions. Therefore all forms of social security imply redistribution of resources.

However, there are obvious differences between ‘modern’ forms of social security, such as the collective insurance schemes provided by welfare states, and ‘traditional’ forms of redistribution, brought about by smaller collectivities such as kin groups and neighbourhoods. Apart from differences in scale, one may think of the different bodies of rules governing the redistribution. The provisions which are characteristic of contemporary welfare states are based on state legislation, that is, rules that were consciously made by legislatures to produce certain redistributive effects. On the other hand, the rules underlying the mutual redistribution effected within, for instance, kin groups could be said to

1 This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at a study day on Anthropological Perspectives on Legal Pluralism, organized by the Dutch Association of Sociology and Anthropology (NSAV) and the Association of the Social-Scientific Study of Law (VSR), Amsterdam, June 21, 1990. The research on which this paper is based, is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).

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have evolved ‘spontaneously’ out of the daily social practice of these groups.

It is often assumed that, once people are entitled individually to state-provided social security, older forms of mutually provided social security will start to wither. In short the reasoning is as follows. If individuals can rely on the state or some public body to support them if need be, they become less dependent on collectivities such as the extended family, on which they formerly had to rely. The binding force of the rights and obligations underlying the mutual redistribution by the members of the extended family will be lessened accordingly. Consequently, individual members will be inclined to withdraw their resources from the common fund, so that eventually there will be no resources left to be redistributed within the family.²

The purpose of this article is to examine how far this reasoning holds when it is applied to the case of Turkish migrants living in the Netherlands. Coming from a society where social security is still provided to a large extent by the kin group (the patrilineal extended family in particular) rather than by the state, these migrants have settled in a society where this function has been largely taken over by the welfare state. I shall focus on how this affects relations between migrant parents and children: how do Turkish parents and children perceive their reciprocal rights and obligations in the Dutch welfare state; and how do they among themselves make use of rules of their society of origin, on the one hand, and of rules of the Dutch welfare state, on the other hand?

The paper is organized as follows. First I shall discuss certain results of studies carried out in Turkey, from which it can be inferred that in that country aged and widowed parents have traditionally been provided for by their sons, in patrilineal extended family households. Ideally, these households would function both as units of consumption and of production (section 2). Next I shall argue that in the Netherlands, where households as a rule are not common production units, this ideal is likely to be eroded by individualizing tendencies (section 3). Following this, I shall try to answer the above questions, using data which I have obtained by anthropological fieldwork among Turkish migrant families. The analysis will be focused on the ideal of the patrilineal extended family household. I shall examine how, and to what extent, migrant parents and children keep up this ideal on the one side, while being entitled to welfare state

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² For examples, see the introduction and the contributions of Slaats and Portier and Freiberg and Jung in F. Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988. On the other hand, K. Von Benda-Beckmann (1991) has demonstrated that integration into the Dutch welfare state has not put an end to traditional forms of support among Moluccan families in the Netherlands.
provisions with built-in individualizing tendencies on the other side (section 4). The paper ends with the conclusion that, contrary to expectations, certain elements of the ideal of the patrilineal extended family household could not be realized by these families until their migration to a welfare state. Yet it is questionable whether Turkish migrant families will keep up this ideal in the long run (section 5).

2. PATRILINEAL EXTENDED FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS IN TURKEY

In a survey of ‘Family Structure and Population Problems’ conducted in Turkey in 1968, it was found that well over half of all households were nuclear family households (composed of husband, wife, and their unmarried children), in villages as well as in metropolitan areas (Timur 1978). This was a surprising finding, as until then the patrilineal extended family (composed of a man and his wife, their unmarried children, and their married sons with their wives and children) had been considered to be the modal household form in Turkey’s rural areas. The survey data also showed, however, that two-thirds of all couples lived with the groom’s parents at the time of their marriage. Three out of four couples broke away from the extended household and founded a nuclear family household within ten years of their marriage. The major cause for the breakup appeared to be the poverty of the family: “If the father is landless or without other productive means, sons leave out of necessity; each son must find means to support his own nuclear family.” (Timur 1978: 236) In rural areas, the proportion of patrilineal extended households was highest among families with larger landholdings. A large majority of peasants, on their own confession, aspired to live in an extended family, too. To them such a household indicated prosperity and prestige.

A similar discrepancy between the ideal and actual practice was found in legal anthropological field work conducted at the same time in a village in western Turkey. The ideal pattern was for a son to bring his wife to live at his parents’ house. The groom’s father was expected to pay the bride-price and the cost of the wedding celebrations, and to furnish the newly-married couple with a room or a nearby house. Only after the death of the patriarch would the house and lands be divided among his offspring. When questioned about residential practice following marriage and bride-price payment, villagers tended to present this ideal pattern. Yet in reality only the wealthier farmer had the necessary means to finance and arrange his son’s marriage before the latter was called for military service. A father who could do this could ensure that his son would stay and work with him. Poorer villagers lacked the means to achieve this ideal. The son
of a poorer family might have to leave his father’s household in order to earn the money needed to pay the costs of his marriage. This might not be achieved until seven or eight years after his military service. Those fathers who could not finance their sons’ marriages would therefore lose control over their sons’ labour (Starr 1978: 67). Thus it seems that most Turks place a high value on living in a patrilineal extended family household, but only the wealthier are able to achieve this ideal.\footnote{Stirling pointed out other, demographic, factors accounting for the failure of households to achieve the patrilineal extended form. In his study of two villages in central Anatolia around 1950, he found that only a quarter of all households in both villages were composed of patrilineal extended families. He argued, however, that at any time half of the households in a village would necessarily be nuclear in form. This was a consequence partly of fission occurring on the death of a patriarch, resulting in the creation of nuclear family households by his married sons, and partly of the length of time it took for a nuclear family to reach the stage of the marriage of its sons and the birth of grandchildren. Thus Stirling contended: “The simple households which contain the majority of the population are not deviant from the ideal. They have simply failed so far to achieve it.” (1965: 40)}

There is another side to the matter, however, for the 1968 demographic survey also revealed that one out of eight households was a ‘transient’ extended family household, in which a nuclear family lived together with either the husband’s or (exceptionally) the wife’s widowed mother or father and/or unmarried siblings.\footnote{The researchers distinguished patriarchal and transient extended family households. An extended family was classified as patriarchal when the father owned the property and controlled the labour of all household members, whereas in a transient extended family, the son was the household head and chief bread-winner. It was found that 19 per cent of all households were composed of patriarchal extended families, and 13 per cent of transient extended families (Timur 1978: 231).} This household form comprised virtually the same proportion in rural and urban areas. Neither did the survey data show a consistent relationship with landholding size. The proportion of transient extended family households did not increase from families owning less land to families with larger landholdings (Timur 1978: 231, 234).

From these data it can be inferred that extended family households are often maintained by less wealthy families, too, as a makeshift arrangement to take care of widows, widowers, and orphans. Extended family households, in other words, are not always indicative of prosperity. Their primary function is not
seldom to compensate for the loss of a breadwinner or caretaker. Orphans and widows and widowers, or, for that matter, aged couples who can no longer work and support themselves, can expect little from the Turkish state. Especially in the rural areas, only a small proportion of the elderly and the disabled are entitled to old-age or widow’s pensions or disability benefits. Likewise, there are not sufficient places in homes for orphans and elderly and disabled persons to accommodate all of them who are homeless, not to mention those who are living with relatives at present.

To sum up, in Turkey the patrilineal extended family household is important both as an ideal at which many parents aim, and as an arrangement by which many aged and infirm parents are actually provided for. Maybe this importance is on the decrease nowadays. The cited studies date back two decades, and urbanization and industrialization have since advanced. As a result of these processes, ever more Turks have come to rely on wage-labour for their livelihood. Timur suggested that this development above all others would result in the prevalence of nuclear family households: “When income and occupation come to depend on factors not controlled by the extended family, as when wage labour becomes common, this creates the possibility of change in the extended family.” (1978:241) Sturr’s finding that sons who were employed as wage-labourers would contribute neither their labour nor their income to their father’s farm, points in the same direction.

3. TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Migration of Turks to the Netherlands started in the 1960s with the arrival of tens of thousands of ‘guest-workers’. It was assumed that they would stay only temporarily, to fill supposedly temporary shortages on the labour market. After the 1973 oil crisis, the recruitment of workers indeed came to an end. Immigration continued throughout the 1970s, however, as many Turkish workers already in the Netherlands were joined by their families. In the 1980s, the inflow of dependants of the first generation of labour migrants declined, but of recent years there has been an increase again in the form of secondary family reunification. Children of first generation migrants are now sending for their future spouses from Turkey. In 1989 the total number of Turks living in the Netherlands was estimated to be 177,000 (Muus 1989).

As most of these migrants have come from rural areas in Turkey, migration to the Netherlands has entailed a different way of living for them. Above all, they have had to get used to different ways of earning their living. In Turkey a majority will have earned at least part of their livelihood from their family farm,
even though a considerable proportion may have got extra earnings from seasonal wage-labour. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, a large majority of Turkish migrants have come to depend completely on wage-labour and/or the welfare state for their living. A survey conducted in 1984 showed that only two per cent of Turkish male heads of households in the Netherlands were self-employed or working in family firms (CBS 1986). By far most migrants with work were employed as labourers in industry. At present, however, many migrants are out of work. In 1989, the unemployment rate among Turks in the Netherlands was 44 per cent. A considerable proportion had been out of work for at least two years (Muus 1989). Therefore it can be assumed that many Turkish migrants have come to live on social insurance benefits or welfare allowances.  

The almost complete dependence on wage-labour and the welfare state for income is likely to entail changes within Turkish migrant families, particularly in the relations between parents and children. The members of a family may still form a unit of common consumption - as long as they continue living together under a single roof and sharing meals - but they are no longer a common production unit. A father and his sons generally do not work in the same firm, and even when they do each earns an individual income. If one of them becomes ill, he cannot have his father, brother, or son replace him at his job. On the other hand, he is entitled to sickness benefits to compensate for the loss of earnings.

In the Netherlands incomes and income security have become individualized. Consequently, one might predict that the individual members of a household will not as a matter of course pool all their income and have the common fund controlled by the head of the family. In the first place, in Dutch circumstances they would be required to hand over the individual income they had earned by their individual work. This clearly would differ from the circumstances of peasant families in Turkey. There the members of a household generally pool their labour and work for a common income under the leadership of the head of

5 The social security system of the Dutch state consists for the greater part of workers' insurance (covering the risks of unemployment, illness and prolonged incapacity for work) and national insurance (providing child benefits and old-age and widow's pensions). The system is completed by the general welfare act, that is meant as a safety net for those who can neither support themselves nor claim social insurance benefits. At present, most Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have secured a residence permit which enables them to lay claim to all the provisions of the system. Illegal immigrants, on the other hand, are excluded rather relentlessly from nearly all provisions.
the family, so that it follows more or less automatically that the latter controls
the common pool of earnings as well. In the second place, in the Netherlands
individual household members may be less inclined to pool their income,
considering that they do not have to rely on the common family fund for support
in case they lose their work or their ability to work. Thus, the ideal of the
patrilineal extended family household is likely to be eroded by individualizing
tendencies.

4. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARENTS AND
CHILDREN

The data presented in this section were collected during eighteen months of
participant observation among Turkish families living in a medium-sized town in
the Netherlands. I cannot claim that my research group was representative of the
total Turkish population of the Netherlands. However, I do not have reason to
assume that research among other families elsewhere in the Netherlands would
have yielded different findings. Table 1 shows how the households in the
research group were composed. Out of a total of 28, six were patrilineal
extended family households, in which a married son and his family were living
with either his parents or his widowed mother. Most of the other households
consisted of a single nuclear family.

4.1. The household cycle

From these data it cannot be inferred that it was from preference that most
migrants did not live in patrilineal extended family households. In the first place,
living together under a single roof was in practice impossible in cases where a
son had married in the Netherlands while his parents remained behind in Turkey.
Secondly, a number of couples who were now living in nuclear family
households had lived with the husband's parents during the first years of their
marriage, either in Turkey or in the Netherlands. The sequence of residential
arrangements adopted by some individuals shows the practicability of the
patrilineal extended family household in various circumstances. Several of the
older men, who had come to the Netherlands as labour migrants, had been living
with their wife and children at their parents' house before their migration. These
men had left their families with their parents in Turkey for some years after
their migration, until they arranged family reunions in the Netherlands. 6 Several

6 Under the Dutch immigration regulations, Turks who are already settled in the
Table 1. Composition of the households in the research group (total: 28 households with 80 adult members)

**patrilineal extended family**

- husband and wife, unmarried children, married son and family: 3
- widow, unmarried children, married son and family: 2
- husband and wife, two married sons and families, relative: 1
- total: 6

**nuclear family**

- husband and wife, without children: 2
- husband and wife, unmarried children: 15
- total: 17

**nuclear family plus relative(s)**

- husband and wife, unmarried children, divorced daughter: 1
- husband and wife, unmarried children, relative: 2
- divorced woman, unmarried children, relative(s): 2
- total: 5

Netherlands are allowed to bring over their spouses and unmarried children under 18 years. Only in exceptional cases will they get residence permits for their parents or other dependants.
younger men who themselves were brought over to the Netherlands by their fathers, brought their brides to live at their parents' houses. However, in these cases the extended family households broke up after some years as a result of the parents' remigration to Turkey.

Thus, the migration process impeded the formation of patrilineal extended family households in some cases, and led to the disintegration of such households in others. Yet in nearly all cases where a married son and his parents were both living in the Netherlands, the son was still living at his parents' house. It is important to note that these parents were not yet so old and frail as to depend on a living-in daughter-in-law for physical care and household chores. Besides, even the widowed mothers were able to provide for themselves and their younger children financially, thanks to their widow's pensions. (Likewise, most of the older male heads of households, although out of work, received welfare payments or social insurance benefits sufficient for themselves and their wives and dependent children to live on.) Therefore these households were not formed and maintained to provide for aged parents in need of support.

4.2. The ideal of the patrilineal extended family household

The ideal of the patrilineal extended family household proved to be still highly valued, especially by the parents in the research group. To be sure, parents of younger children told me they could not imagine their sons bringing their brides to live at their (parents') house, but this did not prevent them from seeing this as an ideal. Parents of older children as a rule counted on their sons to stay with them at least for some years after their marriage. Likewise, most parents disliked what they saw as the Dutch household cycle, in which children would leave their parents' house and set up house on their own at the age of eighteen, even before marriage. Instead of praising their children for their greater attachment, however, the Turkish parents in the research group stressed their heavier parental obligations. "Dutch parents have an easier time than Turkish parents, for Dutch children at the age of eighteen either leave home of their own accord, or are evicted by their parents. From then on Dutch children take care of themselves," a Turkish mother explained to me, implying that her children would need her much longer.

It should be noted that nearly all households in the research group were established either by 'first generation' migrants, or by migrants' children who had themselves been brought to the Netherlands at the age of ten or later, and who, moreover, had had their husband or wife come over from Turkey. At the time of their migration, all of them had expected to return to Turkey after a
short or prolonged stay in the Netherlands. In expectation of that return, nearly all of them had been (or were still) investing the larger part of their savings in Turkey. Although they had remained here longer than they had originally anticipated, many were still expecting or hoping to spend their old age in Turkey.

As their children grew older, however, the parents became more insecure. Returning to Turkey without children was not an attractive prospect for the older generation of migrants. They did not so much fear that they would be unable to manage financially. Provided they would have a house of their own in Turkey and a guaranteed income from the Dutch welfare state, they assumed they would need no financial support from their children. What they feared far more was that they might be in want of assistance. They did not expect much help from relatives in Turkey. Even those who had for years on end remitted money for the support of relatives staying behind did not take it for granted that their circle of kin in Turkey would take care of them after their remigration. They would have preferred to rely on a son, because, they thought, a son would feel much more strongly morally obliged to assist his parents. Women were even more afraid to be left without assistance than men, as they realized they ran a greater risk of outliving their husbands than the other way round. Besides, in the words of an elderly Turkish woman: "In Turkey a widower may remarry, even at the end of his lifetime, but a widow may not, she can only expect help from a son."

The uncertainty of this generation of parents about their old age also explains why they laid great store by their sons' living with them. Once a son has his own household, his parents can be sure that he will not remigrate with them. Another motive influencing this generation of parents, was that they considered it also a matter of prestige for their sons to be committed to them. In Turkey these parents would not have been able to offer their sons sufficient prospects to induce them to stay. In the Netherlands, however, the sons did not have to leave their parents' household out of financial necessity. Indeed, they brought in extra income. Parents are entitled to children’s allowances for their children up to 18 years old. Admittedly, when the children pass that age, parents lose this right. But then those children can themselves claim a welfare allowance if they are out of work. They are entitled to welfare regardless of whether they live with their parents or on their own. (Children living at home are, however, entitled to a lower allowance.) In fact, every person above 18 years in the research group received a regular individual income.

Under these circumstances, the parents took it for granted that their children would stay with them at least until their marriage. The children themselves generally agreed with their parents. None of the children of the families in the research group had made use of his or her individual income to set up a separate
household immediately they reached the age of 18. Moreover, many of the children living at home handed over their earnings to their parents as a matter of course. One may wonder why they did not demand control of their own income. In answer to this question, both the children and their parents would reply that 'in Turkish families, we do not discriminate between what is mine and what is yours, we pool all income and share all expenditure'. However, that was only part of the answer. The children who handed over their earnings assumed tacitly that their parents would save this money to provide for their future requirements.

4.3. Marriage customs and the administration of the childrens' income

Most children, sons as well as daughters, realized that they would not be able to contract a (Turkish) marriage without their parents' assistance. Turkish marriage customs require an elaborate exchange of gifts, both within and between the families of bride and groom. The boy's side usually buys gold bracelets for the bride herself, and sometimes, depending on the region of origin of the families involved, also pays a bride-price to her parents. The girl's side gives the bride a trousseau. In addition, the boy's side is expected to buy most of the furniture needed if the couple intends to set up a separate household. The girl's side furnishes the bedroom suite. Therefore a marriage can be a costly affair, especially for the groom's side. The two families usually agree in advance upon the value of the bridal gifts and the bride-price the groom's side will give. The bride's side is expected to give a proportionally valuable trousseau. During the wedding celebration, the bridal gifts and the trousseau are displayed to the guests. Both sides risk a loss of face if the value of the jewelry and the trousseau is low in proportion to the families' wealth.7

Of course, in Turkey only wealthier families can afford valuable gifts and large wedding celebrations. Marriages between poorer families are accompanied by neither expensive gifts nor great celebrations. For the parents in the research group, who were for the most part descended from poorer peasant families, their children's weddings constituted important occasions for status consumption. They were willing to spend large sums of money (in the order of tens of thousands of guilders) to prove to themselves and to relatives in Turkey that they had fared well abroad. For the same reason, some families celebrated their children's weddings twice, once in the circle of kin living in Turkey, and again

7 See Magnarella (1969) for a more elaborate description of Turkish bridewealth practice.
in the circle of acquaintances they had built up in the Netherlands.

Aside from additional celebrations, however, the money spent on the children’s weddings was not devoted solely to status consumption. Eventually the exchange of gifts was to the material advantage of the newly-weds. They were provided with a starting capital in the form of money, gold and furniture. In several instances the parents of the groom even transferred the ownership of a house in Turkey into the name of their marrying son. The children in the research group were generally well aware of this advantage. They realized that they themselves would not be able to pay for such marriages as were presently arranged by the parents of marrying couples, even though their income might enable them to set up a separate household. Therefore many children took it for granted that before marriage they had to transfer their income to their parents. Likewise, most married sons felt morally obliged to stay with their parents for at least a couple of years, so as to pay off their debt. They sometimes felt obliged not only to their parents, but also to their younger brothers and sisters, because they had all contributed to the financing of the marriage. In these cases, the married sons saw it as their duty to help their parents bear the cost of the younger siblings’ marriages in return.

The parents who administered their children’s income mostly tried to meet the regular household expenses from their own income, and to put the income of the children aside. The majority were unemployed or unable to work. They could imagine how their situation would have been in Turkey. There they would not have been able to save for the children, and the children would rather have had to provide for them. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, they were entitled to social insurance or welfare allowances, which enabled them to manage without their children’s support. However, in this respect an important change of attitude was beginning to manifest itself on the part of the younger generation. Whereas the parents considered that their receipt of an income for their own needs was a big step forward, the children who had immigrated at a younger age took it much more for granted that they did not have to support their parents.

This change of attitude entailed that the children did not always appreciate their parents’ efforts to save for their futures, and did not share the attitude that it was appropriate to continue as adults handing over their individual incomes to their parents. Some children - particularly boys - did not want to deny themselves any of the various pleasures available here and now. They wished to join in with their Dutch peers. They wished to spend more money than their parents were prepared to give them on, for instance, clothes and outings. In a few cases the difference between the parents’ thriftiness and the son’s consumptive aspirations became unbridgeable. The sons demanded control of their own financial affairs. When this happened the parents agreed, mainly because they were afraid that
otherwise their sons would leave home. In these cases the old practice of treating
the incomes of all family members as family income at the disposal of the
parents broke down. When these parents watched their sons spend their whole
income, they felt very frustrated. They hoped that their son would soon wish to
get married, as they thought that marriage was the only event which might bring
him to his senses. However, they realized that he would not be able to bear on
his own the cost of a marriage in accordance with Turkish customs. They were
not unwilling to help him. But apart from the fact that their own resources were
now more limited, precisely because their son kept his own income, they
foresaw that their other children, who had always handed over all their earnings,
would then be vexed.

4.4. The redistribution of the joint household income

In most families, however, the earnings of all the members were pooled and the
joint household income was administered by the parents. If there were
differences of opinion on the allocation of the joint income, parents and children
managed to reach compromises. The children had derived some extra bargaining
power from their individual income. Sons in particular could expect to gain
concessions from their parents. (As for daughters, parents were generally much
less afraid that they might leave.) They often kept part of their earnings, so that
they did not have to ask their parents for money for each and every expense.
When they needed more for themselves, they seldom discussed this at great
length with their parents. Sometimes, however, they alluded to their contribution
to the household income, as if to remind their parents that it was not entirely a
matter of course that they held the purse strings. Even children under eighteen,
who could not claim an individual income, now and again hinted at the
children's allowance their parents received from the Dutch state, implying that
the latter should spend this income on them. Such allusions to the redistributive
rules of the welfare state were usually formulated as jokes. Both parents and
children would laugh, but the message got across all the same.

Likewise, most families never calculated openly how much each member had
contributed to and how much he or she had taken from the joint household
income. Whenever I asked them about this, parents as well as children would
emphasize again that they did not discriminate between each other in financial
matters. However, the principle of sharing all receipts and expenditure did not
prevent the members of a family from making, each for him or herself, cost-
benefit analyses. Thus, a husband and wife who had lived with his family for
some years after their marriage, were able to tell me precisely how much they
paid to his parents during those years: 40,000 guilders. Looking back now that
they had set up their own household, they reproached his parents for not having
transferred part of their property in Turkey into their son's (the husband's) name. The parents, on the other hand, told me that they had to consider their other children's contributions, too. They had three sons and two daughters and up to now they had invested their savings in the purchase of three houses in Turkey. At first they simply intended to provide each of their sons with a house. On second thoughts, however, they did not want their daughters to be left empty-handed, for the latter also paid over their income for a couple of years, until they got married. Now it was the parents' intention to save up a proportionate amount of money for their daughters first, and only then to divide their property in Turkey among their sons.

This case did not stand alone. In several other families, too, the parents kept accounts of the contributions of each of their children to the joint household income, with a view to redistributing the joint savings more or less proportionately. According as a child contributed more, he or she would get more money to spend individually, and moreover each child would receive a proportionate starting-capital at marriage. Thus the redistribution within the family was adapted to the individualized incomes prevalent in the Netherlands.8

It is interesting to note that these newly emerging redistributive rules, no matter how roughly applied, were to the advantage of daughters. In addition to receiving jewelry from their in-laws at marriage, they were endowed by their own parents, too. Particularly if a daughter was married off to a (less wealthy) relative in Turkey, as had often occurred in the research group, it was not considered reasonable to expect the groom's side to pay for all the furniture. Admittedly daughters received a smaller starting-capital than their brothers, but the latter contributed to their parents' household income for a longer time. This difference in contributions arose partly because daughters were given in marriage at a younger age than sons, and partly because daughters left their parents' household when they married.

Children who contributed to the joint household income often got some say in decisions on the allocation of the joint savings. Even when their parents did not

8 I found a few exceptions to the rule of individualized incomes. For instance, several families worked in horticulture in summer. They undertook this work as a family enterprise. At the end of each day the family would count its total production and the father would collect the joint wages. A few other families had set up firms. All members of the family would contribute their labour without being paid individually. In all those instances, however, the family enterprise was neither the only nor the largest source of income; the family members also received individual wages or allowances.
consult them about these decisions, the children would still feel involved and keep themselves informed of the investments made by their parents. The latter themselves to some extent aroused their children’s interest, for they would always stress that they were making every investment not so much for themselves as with a view to their children’s future. Nevertheless, parents and children did not always agree on the allocation of their joint savings. In many families the parents attached more value to investments in Turkey than did the children. An important motive was, again, that the parents hoped to spend their old age in their home country. To that end they needed at least a house for themselves. However, nearly all parents were inclined to purchase more than one house, so as to provide for their sons as well. They kept hoping - sometimes against their better judgement - that their sons would remigrate together with them. Most of the sons, on the other hand, did not consider this a real prospect. They still attached some value to a house of their own in Turkey, but not as much as their parents did. Moreover, they sometimes preferred to make investments in the Netherlands. Sons who were out of work, in particular, would give preference to establishing a business in the Netherlands over acquiring ownership of a house in Turkey.

Likewise, parents were sometimes more inclined than their children to remit large amounts of money to relatives who had remained in Turkey. Parents attached more importance to holding their place with the kin group at home with an eye to their eventual return: they realized they might want to fall back upon their relatives then. Furthermore, parents felt a stronger moral obligation to share their prosperity with their kin in Turkey, because they remembered how they had grown up together. Both motives weighed much less with children who had grown up in the Netherlands. Therefore those children were sometimes not so much moved as vexed when relatives staying behind asked for support, and they would sometimes try to curb their parents when the latter intended to remit large sums of money to Turkey.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to what might have been expected, migration to the Netherlands did not bring on a quick erosion of the ideal of the patrilineal extended family household among the Turkish families in the research group. On the contrary, it was migration which brought the ideal within the reach of some families. In most families, the guaranteed incomes provided by the Dutch welfare state were for the greater part pooled for joint savings. In this way the parents got the means to finance their sons’ marriages and, moreover, to provide them with a starting-capital. Most of these migrants came from peasant families. In Turkey, they
would not have been able to offer their sons sufficient prospects. As to the sons, most of them were prepared to stay on with their parents and to contribute at least part of their income to the common household fund, if only because of the benefits they expected to reap from the joint savings. Thus, a great part of the income provisions to which individual family members could and did lay claim, were transferred to the joint household fund, to be redistributed within the family. From this finding it can be inferred that state-provided social security does not automatically induce a decline in mutually-provided social security.

On the other hand, it is hardly conceivable that mutual provision will remain unchanged. In the Turkish research group the individualized incomes did entail changes in the rules underlying redistribution within the family. As the contributions of all individual members to the joint household income could be calculated precisely, it was less and less taken for granted that parents alone decided on the allocation of the common fund. Sons in particular were in a position to demand some say in these decisions, because parents attached great value to having their sons live with them. Hence also, many sons were enabled to keep part of their income for themselves. As a further consequence, parents were inclined to keep accounts of their children’s individual contributions to the common fund, with an eye to redistributing the joint savings proportionally. As regards daughters, it was taken more and more for granted that they, in common with their brothers, had a right to an appropriate starting-capital at marriage, inasmuch as they also contributed to the joint household income. Thus, the redistributive rules of the Dutch welfare state did not fail to affect the redistribution within the family. The contributions of the individual members were taken into account more, and more explicitly.

Though the ideal of the patrilocal extended family household still had much binding force, there were differences between the generations in the research group. Parents generally set greater store by the establishment and maintenance of such a household than their children. Whereas many parents kept hoping that one of their sons would stay on to take care of them in their old age, the younger generation seemed more inclined to regard the extended family household as a temporary arrangement, serving the purpose of saving up a starting-capital. This difference between the generations might lead one predict an erosion of the ideal. However, it may be mistaken to base conclusions on such a rigid distinction between the generations. Most migrants’ children still have their marriage partners come over from Turkey. In a sense, these marriage partners are again ‘first generation’ migrants, and so may give the ideal a new lease of life. This certainly was the parents’ hope when they had a bride come over from Turkey for their son. They assumed that a newly immigrated daughter-in-law would be more willing to live with them and attend to their wants than a girl who had grown up in the Netherlands. However, it is
questionable whether parents will in the long run remain in a position to influence their children’s choice of a marriage partner.

In conclusion I would like to pose another question: how will the Dutch welfare state develop, and what will be the socio-economic position of immigrants in the Netherlands in the future? Of late many Turkish migrants have become dependent on welfare payments for their livelihood. At the same time, a policy of retrenchment has made itself felt in the Dutch welfare state. Consequently, many Turkish households have seen their income reduced substantially. In many cases where husband and wife both used to have a paid job, they now have to manage with one minimum welfare allowance. If they have children above 18 years who bring in income, even this allowance will be reduced. Thus many families are less and less able to realize joint savings. If the socio-economic position of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands does not improve, this may in the long run lead to the decline of forms of social security provided within the family. However, that would be the result of collective disadvantage rather than of individual freedom of choice.

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