THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COLONIAL
REALITY: YAURI EMIRATE

Frank A. Salamone

Introduction

British changes in the traditional power structure of colonized peoples ultimately strengthened traditional ruling classes. The process through which that took place provides the theme of this work. Analysis of *The Yaouri Day Book* supplies both basic data and perspective for developing the theme.

*The Yaouri Day Book* is a remarkable document. Basically, it is a diary of the transactions between the *Sarkin Yaouri*, Abdullahi, and P.G. Harris, the District Officer, Yaouri. The book consists of a series of entries, in Hausa, of appointments, questions and answers initiated by either Harris or Abdullahi, and of government lists, policies, appointments, and numerous other details of the actual day-to-day running of an Emirate in Northern Nigeria between 17 May 1928 and 2 September 1931.

1. I thank Robert Heussler for sending me a copy of *The Yaouri Day Book* in translation. The translation is by Musa B. Gadzama and was authorized by Alhaji M. Tukur, the late emir of Yaouri and Abdullahi's son. I also wish to thank Anthony Kirk-Greene for his advice and generosity with materials. This paper is based on one written as part of a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on Power and Class in Africa, Summer 1983. I wish to thank Irving L. Markovitz for his advice and direction. All responsibility for errors is, of course, mine. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments. To Virginia, Frank and Catherine, who are all the power and class I shall ever need.

*Copyright 1987 - Frank A. Salamone*
The *Yauri Day Book*, however, is much more than a simple listing of transactions between 'partners' in the Dual Mandate. It is a documentation of the process of capturing and pacifying the peasantry. It is a virtual handbook on how to extend the power of the central government over the minute details of rural life, and, consequently, how to erode the power and privileges of local groups within a colony. The *Day Book* makes clear the cost and the limits of constructed reality. Harris and Abdullahi were sometimes trapped by their mutually constructed version of colonial reality, but each was able to achieve basic goals within its context.

The *Day Book*, moreover, permits a rare glimpse into the process through which a model colonial administrator and chief formulated and achieved goals in a period in which indirect rule had been firmly established but not yet vigorously attacked. In essence, therefore, it was in its classic manifestation, demonstrating clearly its basic structure without the rhetoric attendant on its implementation nor with the muckiness contingent upon the defensiveness that marred its practice after attacks by Nigerian nationalists. Because of the classic nature of the Yauri case, as revealed in the *Day Book*, therefore, it is possible to isolate typical features of indirect rule in action. Such isolation facilitates comparison with other case studies, providing a solid empirical base for the generation of testable hypotheses.

For example, the process through which local rulers in Yauri strengthened their power under British rule through negotiating a mutually acceptable version of colonial reality with their colonial masters cannot be unique to one small emirate, especially to one that was so often cited as a model for progressive indirect rule (Heussler, 1968: Sharwood-Smith, 1969:74). Indeed, Yauri's circumstances offer parallels with Dorward's (1974) suggestion that both administrators and rulers among the Tiv of Northern Nigeria agreed to accept a negotiated version of reality that he terms a 'working misunderstandings'.

Dorward argues, rather persuasively, that a series of 'working misunderstandings' developed in order to ease the control of colonial administrators as well as chiefs over those outside the political administration. It had the added virtue, moreover, of maintaining the fictions of indirect rule, fictions resulting from the British conquest of the Sokoto Empire in 1903. That conquest presented the British with an enormous tract of land to govern, one so large that they had little idea of its size or population. Therefore, an ideology developed
in which the 'Hamitic' Hausa-Fulani whom the British had conquered became models for civilization and partners in its spread.

Although Dorward is correct in his assessment of the overall colonial situation in Nigeria, and probably elsewhere as well, his study concerns itself with the Tiv and not with one of the 'classic' cases of indirect rule. Therefore, his insight that acceptance of colonial ideology "by the government led to the development of a symbiotic relationship between the cultures of paternalism and subservience" and that "such symbiosis involved numerous 'working misunderstandings', arising from conceptual models which had proven meaningful in one situation being applied under quite different circumstances" (Dorward, 1974:45) is open to the criticism that, while suggestive, it has not been tested through a study of a classic emirate, for the Tiv were far from centralized and not a real test, therefore, of indirect rule.

Yauri, however, was the very model of a progressive emirate under indirect rule. Therefore, it presents an ideal case to test Dorward's ideas and to allow for their development beyond the point to which he had taken them. Thus, in Yauri, as in Tivland, a priority for both British and local rulers was the capturing and pacification of the peasantry. Neither could afford an uncontrolled mass existing and operating outside the 'legitimate' polity. The Day Book, indeed, offers keen insight into the process of capturing and pacifying the peasantry. It offers even more: namely, a clear example of collaboration in the extension of centralized control in a situation of colonial rule.

Crowder (1970) offers insight into the general process through which the British extended centralized control in Nigeria. Crucial to understanding the process is the fact that in a sense no ruler was strictly legitimate after the British conquest, for after the conquest all rulers relied for their power on outsiders (Crowder, 1970:xi). The fact that Fulanis had ruled local chiefs through the right of conquest, of course, gave Lugard his rationale for colonial indirect rule and his claim to legitimacy. With rare exceptions, Crowder claims, the British were concerned with continuing the reigns of legitimate dynasties. Of course, there were misunderstandings and more than a hint of various manipulations occurring on both sides.

Eventually, however, accommodations were made and, in general, most 'legitimate' chiefs discovered that their real power in local affairs had grown, for "these same chiefs had removed for them by the colonial regime many of the limitations to their authority from below"
(Crowder 1970:xiv). In fact, a strong chief could overawe a young District Officer (Smith, 1970:21), and "no factor was more important in determining the nature of government than the personalities of British officers and African rulers and the way they blended in practice" (Heussler, in Smith, 1970:17).

Markovitz (1977:168-172) clearly indicates the value of attending to the continuity in African rule and its ruling classes in order to grasp the significance of current African politics. If we are ever to emerge from the stage of suggestive generalizations and 'the broad picture', we must move to the micro-level of relevant case studies which enable us to proceed with the tedious but rewarding task of teasing out the strands of 'traditional', 'Western' and 'mixed' threads from the warp and woof of current African political garb.

This study of Yauri from 1902-1931 is a case study which, in fact, sheds light on broader themes. It looks at an emirate in two distinct periods, under two distinct sets of rulers. One set was incept and failed in its overall goals. The other was competent and the very model, presumably, of the virtues of indirect rule. Interestingly, it was the efficient set which led to the spread of centralization and which provides empirical and theoretical data for the extension of the concept of 'working misunderstandings'.

Setting

Yauri Emirate is located in the northwest corner of Sokoto State, Nigeria. By the time of the British conquest it was the smallest of the Hausa emirates, and, as was proper for one of the Hausa banza, their westernmost outpost along the Niger River. Yauri has never been a Fulani state, although it has paid tribute to the Fulani Sultan at Sokoto. Its rulers have generally been careful to stress their separate 'Hausa' identity and, therefore, their distinction from Fulani. Yauri's rulers form a Hausaized minority among an ethnically heterogeneous population.

By 1800 they had worked out basic patterns of political and economic interaction with Yauri's 'indigenous' ethnic groups - Kamberi, Shangawa, Reshe (Gungawa), Hune (Dukawa). In turn, these groups had negotiated the basic patterns of their occupational interactions and political stances; in other words, their ethnic identities. Changes in political, economic, and occupational interactions led to changes in ethnic identities (cf. Salomone, 1974). Other ethnic groups, with no claims of indigenousness, have periodically entered the area and,
typically, provided native groups with goods and services. The Fulani, for example, supply dairy products, meat, and fertilizer. The Serkawa, an occupational if not a separate ethnic group, are professional fishermen. The 'Hausa' provide rulers. In turn, each of the indigenous groups has a specialty which supplies it with its proper ecological niche and identity.

Each of Yauri's indigenous groups had come to it at different times, and each chose a different ecological niche to exploit. Personnel, of course, moved from one group to another, and changes in niches led to changes in ethnic identity, for it was essential to Yauri's negotiated reality to maintain a dynamic stability in interethnic relationships.

The Kamberi were the first group to occupy Yauri, settling there, perhaps, even before the Mali and Songhay invasions of the 13th-15th centuries (Balogun, 1970:38; Adamu, 1968:31). Much about the Kamberi is a matter of conjecture, but it seems clear that they had a centralized form of government, have long been excellent farmers and engaged in hunting. Throughout the major portion of Yauri's history, moreover, they occupied Yauri's heartland. They were so successful at farming, furthermore, that they used their steady farm surpluses to generate relationships with other groups. Additionally, they neglected the development of riverine opportunities.

That potential was nicely exploited by the Reshe, called Gungawa (island-dwellers) by the Hausa. The origin of the Gungawa is still a matter of some dispute. However, it seems clear that when the Songhay invaded Yauri in the sixteenth century they left behind some soldiers who likely merged with island dwellers (cf. Roder, 1970; Adamu, 1968; Harris, 1930). Adamu (1968:27) calls them a 'mixed group' by which he means that the Gungawas were formed by the union over time of members from a number of different ethnic groups who adapted to a riverine environment. Adamu (personal communication) further maintains that this process had been fairly completed by the fourteenth century, for by the sixteenth century the fifth king of the Gungawa had become the first Emir of Yauri.

Like the Kamberi and Reshe the ancestors of the Hune (Dukawa) came to Yauri from northeastern Nigeria and form a group closely related to them linguistically and culturally. Greenburg (1966:8) places them in the same branch of the Benue-Congo language family. So similar are Kamberi and Hune linguistically, Gunn and Conant (1960) mistakenly assert that they are mutually intelligible. Members of the three groups share similar origin myths and can trace their
founders back to members of the legendary Kisra’s family (cf. Crowder 1968 and Adamu 1968 for versions of the Kisra legend).

Although they are excellent horticulturists, the Hune are the only group in the area to define themselves in terms of their hunting prowess. Simply put, to be a Hune is to be a hunter. In conformity with that image is the Hune reputation for independence and truculence. When fighting has proved insufficient for safeguarding their freedom, they have turned to flight.

Hune, Kamberi, Reshe - all came to Yauri in an attempt to escape slave raids, raids that increased into the twentieth century and that led to the rise of the Jerabawa dynasty.

Indeed, even the Shangawa, a branch of the Kengawa of Borgu and descendants, according to some accounts, of Songhay warriors and local peoples, began to feel the pressures of increasing slave raids in the nineteenth century. At that time, their cooperation with the Jerabawa dynasty certainly increased and their contribution to the membership of the Hausaized elite grew more important (cf. Harris, 1938:307-308; Salamone, 1974b:41-42; and Salamone in Weekes, 1984).

It was, in fact, the cooperation of Shangawa and Reshe that made possible the rise of the Jerabawa dynasty and its Hausaized councilors. There were centralized rulers in Yauri before the Hausa. Reshe and Kamberi had centralized governments by the sixteenth century and Shangawa had ties to their relatives in Borgu. The fifth king of the Reshe, Tafariliu, became the first Sarkin Yauri (chief of Yauri). Thus, some time in the sixteenth century the Reshe became rulers of the center of the emirate. Interestingly, the third Emir, Ibrahim (1689-1708) was both the first Muslim emir as well as the founder of the Jerabawa dynasty. Whether he was placed in office by the legendary Amina of Zaria or not, the fact that he was a Muslim is the significant factor. Indeed, it is most likely that he was a Reshe who 'became' Hausa in order to reap the benefits of affiliation with that religion: namely, political centralization, administrative organization, trade, connections with a far-reaching network of states sharing a common civilization and religion.

Ibrahim's action was also a response to intensive internal and external pressures. Externally, his action precluded the waging of a jihad against Yauri by Kebbi. Internally, it aided his dynasty's consolidation of power against Kamberi and remaining Reshe centers of power. By the end of the eighteenth century the Jerabawa dynasty had established a basic administrative structure adapted to Yauri's
ethnic heterogeneity as well as means for recruiting members of his allied groups, Shangawa and Reshe, into the ruling Hausa strata.

Much of the confusion in the literature concerning the identity of the 'Yaurawa' (literally, people of Yauri) in fact dissipates when one views it as a transitional category through which potential recruits for the ruling strata passed on their way to becoming Hausa. Most of those who passed through the Yaurawa stage, in contradistinction to the general term 'Yaurawa', were Reshe and Shangawa, seeking to change their ethnic identities in order to become members of the ruling minority (cf. Adamu, 1968 and Salamone, 1975 for fuller discussions of the process involved and its significance).

The very processes that led to the emergence of the Jerabawa dynasty were almost its undoing. The nineteenth century was a period of intensification of ethnic change, in-migration, slave raiding, and Islamization of the ruling class. It was also the period in which Usman dan Fodio, through the use of jihad, established the leadership of the Sokoto Caliphate. The dual threat of Ngawase of Kontagora's slave raids and conquest by the forces of the Caliphate led to the negotiation of tributary status (dhimmi). The Emir of Yauri, Muhammad Dan Azi, had negotiated peace in hopes of preserving Yauri's integrity and strengthening the position of Islam within Yauri (Balogun, 1970: 100 and 128).

He failed in attaining his first goal. Yauri continued to suffer from Fulani slave raids, directed from Kontagora. It also continued to lose territory, shrinking from a territory that stretched from Kebbi to Kaduna and south to Nupe areas almost to its present shrunken boundaries which make it the smallest of the emirates (cf. Adamu, 1968 for a detailed description of Yauri's nineteenth century woes).

If his first aim was a failure, however, the second was a rousing success. The prestige of Islam in Yauri increased as the century drew to a close. Islam provided a sense of stability in a period of chaotic decline. Its practice increased among both nobles and commoners. Its teachers offered religious and magical comfort, and its law settled disputes among members of Yauri's disparate ethnic groups. Furthermore, only those who were clearly identifiable as Muslims were relatively safe from Fulani slave raiders. The Kamberi and Dukawa, therefore, who were least Muslim in appearance suffered most from the slave raids. The Kamberi, who lost tremendous numbers of people, took to the bush in order to survive. In so doing they changed their centralized structure into a decentralized one. The
Dukawa turned to another strategy for survival, the building of fortressed towns under centralized rulers.

When the British occupied Yauri in 1902, inheriting it from the Royal Niger Company, it was, in Adamu's words, an emirate in serious decline (Adamu 1968). Its physical size had shrunk from over 17,000 square miles to 1,486, and its population from over 100,000 to 35,125. Further adding to its loss of prestige was the fact that the British placed it in Kontagora Province, an area it had once ruled and still claimed as its own. Even more insulting was its merger in 1907 with its old enemy, Borgu, in Borgu Province, a move made to protect other areas against possible French encroachment (Duff, 1970:1).

In spite of its shrinking boundaries and loss of population, however, Yauri remained remarkable for its ethnic and occupational heterogeneity. There were 7,000 Kamberi, 16,200 Reshe (Gungawa), 3,575 Yaurawa, 5,000 Shangawa, 1,600 Hausa, and 1,150 Fulani. Because of British tampering with Yauri's boundaries, no Dukawa or Lopawa are mentioned as being in Yauri at the time, although there were over 14,000 of them in 1902. Each ethnic group specialized in exploiting particular ecological niches: the Hausa were rulers and craftsmen: Reshe were fisherfolk and traders; Dukawa, hunters; Kamberi, the best farmers and workers of magic; Shangawa, the most 'civilized' and traders. With the exception of the Hausa, all groups also farmed. The occupations pursued by the Hausa included dyeing, blacksmithing, butchering, carpentry, canoe making, mat making, pottery, and smelting (Duff 1970:35). More than 50% of Kontagora's craftsmen were in Yauri although it had only 20% of the population. British control added to Yauri's ethnic and occupational heterogeneity. The Pax Britannica allowed freer and safer movement of people from one area to another by eliminating warfare and slave raids. It also created a demand for administrative skills mainly present in the longer occupied southern areas of Nigeria. These southerners, in turn, added to Yauri's ethnic and occupational heterogeneity, for not only did their families accompany them to Yauri, but they demanded goods and services, many of a Western nature, not then available in Yauri. The British, too, it should be noted, were a new ethnic group in Yauri's already complicated ethnic mix.

Aliyu, the Usurper

It was part of early British colonial policy in Northern Nigeria to rule through flexible traditional rulers. Toward that end, they kept a
promise to Sarkin Abershi to appoint his son Jibrilu (1904-1915) as ruler. Abershi had earned that promise through his aid in establishing British rule in the area (Harris, 1938:289-290). Although such loyalty on the part of the British was admirable, it also contradicted Yauri's customs. It is the custom in Yauri for the traditional kingmakers to select the emir from members of the Jerabawa dynasty. The title does not automatically pass from father to eldest son, for there is no law of primogeniture.

In 1915 the British were forced to attempt to rectify their mistake, for Jibrilu could not rule, especially when given authority over Bussa in its union with Yauri in 1914. Harris (1938: 290-291) sums up the situation:

... Jibrilu had to be deposed for 'mental incapacity'. Instructions given by the Administration to the Emir were not conveyed and, thanks to obstruction from the office holders ... orders were not carried out. If the appointment of Jibrilu in the face of tradition was a mistake, the appointment now made was disastrous.

The disastrous appointment was that of Sarkin Aliyu of Jabo (1915-1923). Aliyu was not only not a member of the Jerabawa family, he was neither a Hausa nor from Yauri. In sum, he was everything a Sarkin Yauri should not be. He was a Fulani from Jabo, near Sokoto, who had come to Yauri as a small boy. Aliyu's father, in fact, had been a slave. Fergus Dwyer, the first political officer of Kontagora and several times acting resident of Kontagora or Borgu, noted that he had a malformation on the right side of his face that led to the widespread belief that he was a victim of witchcraft. It seems that he had been one of those unfortunate children who invite abuse, and his age-mates mocked and slapped him at will. Moreover, his light skin set him apart from others, inviting even more hostility (Crowder, 1973:127).

Aliyu's rise to power cannot be understood separately from the career of J.O.C. Clarke. In 1911 Clarke had been in Yauri for a brief time as assistant resident. No matter how brief the time, he quickly lived up to his colonial service reputation as 'overzealous' by dividing the emirate into six districts and replacing office holders whom he deemed inefficient by fiat. Aliyu was his confidential messenger. Their ability to work together led Clarke to promote him to the position of Sarkin Yamma (Ruler of the West), the first to hold that title denoting the district head of Gungu (Island) district.
Not only did this promotion place him over Yauri's industrious Reshe (Gungawa) but it defied tradition. Appointing outsiders, even slaves, was not against tradition. But appointing those who had conspired against previous rulers, as Aliyu had done, was a break with precedent. Moreover, Aliyu had an independent power base in his British contacts. Emirs did not typically appoint outsiders with independent bases as powerful district heads.

Aliyu's prospect soared when the easy-going, but rather incompetent resident, Hamilton-Browne returned Clarke to Yauri on 30th December 1912. Clarke took advantage of the relatively free hand he enjoyed and began to flout Yauri's traditions and laws, demonstrating a lack of understanding of its history, ethnography, and culture. Thus, he forbade peasants from crossing the Niger from Bussa to Yauri, ordered 'natives' to stay with their chiefs, ignored the traditional boundary of the Niger between Borgu and Yauri and incorporated Borgu into Yauri for a time, termed the Kamberi (Yauri's original rulers and founders) "the most backward of pagans", and otherwise demonstrated how far he was from understanding 'his natives'.

If, however, Clarke's actions are seen as resulting not from ignorance of local ways, but as from indifference to them in terms of his broader objectives, then they are more easily understandable. We might then fault his execution of policy, differ with that policy even, but focus on the essentials of what he was trying to accomplish. The broader policy that he sought to implement came straight from Lugard.

Quite simply, indirect rule sought to maintain British economic interests in a caste-like structure in which the Fulani were to serve as allies. Lugard sought to enlist the conquered and 'alien' Fulani as captains, ensure their loyalty through setting up a taxation policy that would ensure them of appropriate compensation, control the collection of those taxes, and guide people on the road to civilization in union with his allied Fulani partners. "Lugard's idea of rule was simple autocratic rule from himself downwards" (Nicholson, 1969:137). Such a policy would pay for itself and protect trade (Nicholson, 1969: 144-147).

In order to achieve such goals, a pacification and capturing of the peasantry had to be effected. Hyden (1980) has a very simple meaning for his phrase 'capturing the peasantry'. He means that all economic, political, and socio-cultural independence is impossible for the peasantry. The peasantry, in sum, exists only in terms of the
central government, and all sources for separate identity are either destroyed or controlled by it.

In Yauri's case, this meant that the Reshe and Hune had to be effectively controlled, albeit for very different reasons. The Hune (Dukawa) provided stubborn opposition to the imposition of the Pax Britannica (NANK:SNP 17/a6099 vol.1). Aliyu's willingness to cooperate with Clarke in transferring four Dukawa towns and 3071 Hune to Rijau district earned him Clarke's loyal support, for the Hune had been presenting numerous problems for his administration - refusing to pay taxes, waging war, sending petitions, etc.

The Reshe presented another kind of problem, for Clarke could not complain of them, as he had of the Hune, that their leaders were dotards (letter to resident Kontagora dated October 6, 1917). Quite the contrary seemed true to Clarke. Reshe leaders were quite competent and the Reshe were regarded as "the most prosperous and enterprising of Yauri's tribes" (E.C. Duff, letter from resident Kontagora to secretary Northern provinces, Kaduna: NANK:Sok. Prof.150/1918). It was just their ability and obvious position of favor with most British administrators that posed a threat and caused the downfall of Aliyu and Clarke.

The Reshe had supplied Yauri's first emir and possibly the founder of the Jerabawa dynasty. They had long survived on their island fortresses and controlled fishing and riverine trade. Their onions and fish provided Yauri with its major exports, and its people provided the Hausa ruling dynasty with recruits for inclusion among the Hausa via the Yaurawa category. Their support had to be either sought or compelled if trade along the Niger were to prosper. Unfortunately, but understandably given Aliyu's precarious position, Aliyu and Clarke sought to coerce the Reshe into cooperating. Aliyu was a past master at coercion. His career included murder, extortion and many varieties of misfeasance and malfeasance of power. In turn, Clarke exhibited a remarkable skill at dismissing any opinions contrary to his own whether those opinions were Nigerian or British. Thus, he summarily dismissed the petitions of the people of Yauri against Aliyu and claimed that Aliyu would be an acceptable choice as emir to the Sultan of Sokoto and the emir of Gwandu, the highest rulers in Hausaland. L. Blake, the district officer of Yauri, said that there was "not one word of truth in his statement" (quoted in Crowder, 1973:108).

That common disregard for the truth finally caught up with Aliyu and Clarke. Perhaps both of them took Flora Lugard's ranking of
Nigerian ethnic groups too seriously and really believed that Fulani were 'natural rulers' while Hausa were merely former rulers now turned to industry and trade (cf. Flora Lugard's A Tropical Dependency for her elaborate development of the hypotheses of 'racial' ranking; see also Evans-Pritchard, 1951, for a discussion of the setting in which colonial ideology developed and a discussion of that ideology).

As Crowder (1973) so well demonstrates, Aliyu and Clarke fell because, with Lugard's blessing, they tried to unite Borgu and Yauri into 'Greater Yauri'. Economic exploitation of the Niger was to override other considerations. The revolt that followed, however, forced the British administrators to reconsider their policy, or at least its implementation. Although they did not abandon their goals, they became more circumspect and sensitive in pursuing them.

Although the British were forced to dissociate themselves from Aliyu through deposing him for tax embezzlement, he had served them well. Perhaps the fact that they made him head of the Works Department in Sokoto rather than jailing him was an attempt to recognize their debt. Aliyu, albeit gracelessly, had strengthened the power of the central government at the expense of local ethnic groups. He concentrated the Reshe in Yauri and thereby focussed their industry. His policies split the ‘truculent’ and democratic Hune, and they accordingly became less of a threat to stability. Their sacred towns, Duku and Iri, became a permanent part of Kontagora. Thus, Aliyu took significant steps to capture the peasantry and make them dependent on the central government.

Abdullahi the Good and P.G. Harris

The professionalism of Abdullahi and Harris contrasts markedly with the clumsy amateurism of their predecessors. Although overall British colonial policy did not change its goals, its methods did change. Harris was an example of a post-World War I administrator. He attended public school, studied law, had a distinguished military record (including time in Nigeria), joined the Nigerian Administrative Service and rose rapidly enough. From 1924 to 1933 he served in Yauri. During that time he studied anthropology, obtaining a diploma in 1933. He published ethnological articles in prestigious journals. In sum, he typified the gentleman-scholar administrator who appreciated Hausa-Fulani culture and that of their subject peoples.
Abdullahi, who was only twenty-two when he became emir, was an essential element in the slightly older Harris' self-image. He was 'good', never lost sight of Yauri's interests, observed traditional forms, and sought the co-operation of the *talakawa* (commoners). The differences between Abdullahi and Aliya, however, were not merely idiosyncratic. They were also structural. Aliyu had had no legitimacy. He sought merely to advance his own interests. Abdullahi, in contrast, was the legitimate heir of the Jerabawa dynasty. Yauri's interests and his were inextricable intertwined, for he depended not only on the British but, as a legitimate heir, on the good will of the *talakawa*.

Harris, in turn, realized that in helping Abdullahi achieve his goals he ensured his co-operation in British schemes. Thus, Harris encouraged the return of Hune to Yauri while working for the return of Rijau district (NANK:SNP/k6066, vol.II, especially the letter of P.G. Harris to the district officer, Gwandu, on April 2, 1930, and the letter of the secretary of the Northern Provinces, Kaduna to the resident of Sokoto province, July 5, 1930). In aiding Abdullahi strengthen his power over the peasantry Harris, of course, was also promoting British interests. At the same time, it should be noted, he was engaged in changing the traditional power structure while claiming to preserve it.

The stability resulting from the imposition of British rule frustrated resistance to the emir's power (cf. Smith, 1970:21, and especially Crowder, 1970: xiv and xxiii). The traditional patterns of migration into Yauri were changed and the number of Hausa significantly increased. In addition, there was an increase in the number of people changing ethnic identities from Reshe to Yaurawa to Hausa. Harris promoted this ethnic identity change because Hausa-Reshe solidarity aided British achievement of their economic goals.

Crowder (1973:156) is not completely accurate when he states that political agents or interpreters gained great power because chiefs and administrators often imperfectly understood one another's languages. Although, for example, Abdullahi was a 'chief', he understood English rather well, having taught it before being named emir. Harris, moreover, spoke Hausa fluently. The British administration was often willing to let political agents gain power quite simply because it served their interests to allow them to do so. Any errors that proved too costly could, as in Aliyu's case, be disowned. In the case of legitimate and popular rulers like Abdullahi, increase in power could be 'justified' as an evolutionary extension of traditional rule.
The Yauri Day Book, now translated into English, is more than a simple log of daily events on which emir and administrative officer conferred. It is, in fact, a record of their mutual social construction of colonial reality. While claiming to preserve a traditional form of government, two competent young men (twenty-two and thirty at the beginning) were actually engaged in transforming the very structure of that government through increasing its centralized power and control over very disparate elements.

Behind the friendly banter and polite courtesies, the mutual shaping of perceptions is obvious. Although each man had deep affection for the other, neither could forget that he was the representative of a different governing system from the other. Similarly, power was never far from the surface comments. Behind the surface structure, in fact, is a 'deep structure', a language of power.

Indeed, the Yauri Day Book is almost obsessed with power relationships. One must, however, read between and behind the lines, and translate from the usually polite language of diplomacy to the raw language of power. For example, even a simple tabulation of topics from May 18 to December 31, 1928, reveals colonial interests rather clearly. 44% of all discussions concerned economic matters while education and health lagged far behind at 5% and 1% respectively (N=164). Surprisingly, Harris made only two ethnographic inquiries. Although his style was different from Clarke's, his policies and interests were not.

The full complexity of the relationship between Harris and Abdullahi is not conveyed through a mere listing of topics. Lists do not convey a sense of tone, nor of subtle and significant changes over time in their relationship. Within a very short time, the Day Book records a change from Harris' attempt to dominate Abdullahi to Abdullahi's subtle manipulation of Harris. Abdullahi had earned his respect and had begun to press for the implementation of policies important to Yauri. The closer, of course, Abdullahi could depict Yauri's reality and interests to that of British colonial ideology and interests, the more successful he was in achieving them.

For example, a priority for both British and Hausa rulers in Yauri was the pacification of the peasantry. Neither could afford an uncontrolled mass outside the legitimate polity. Groups outside governmental control were a threat to the stability of commerce and a challenge to the government's legitimacy. Therefore, it was of mutual interest to 'pacify' the Hune and to symbolize this pacification through the regular and peaceful collection of taxes. Moreover, any
Hune and their territory transferred to Kontagora had to be regained. At the least, these Hune had to be encouraged to petition for their return to their legitimate ruler.

*The Yauri Day Book* offers keen insight into the means through which Abdullahi and Harris worked together to extend their control of the peasantry while increasing centralized power. The first three pages of the *Day Book* are filled with laws regulating farming and commodity marketing, a portent of things to come. Not only does Abdullahi exhort farmers to be more industrious, he also encourages them to sell their produce only on Yelwa Market Day. Never should they sell to strangers. The reason is clear, for Abdullahi was careful to obtain strict accounting for all market transactions in order that the government should receive its customary share of the profits. Moreover, both Harris and Abdullahi carefully checked the collection of taxes, their appropriateness, the completeness of lists, and, in short, anything that would give them information about and control over any aspect of Yauri's life. Indeed, Abdullahi's control over the seemingly interminable lists extended his control well into the modern sphere, including control over immigration and emigration (*YDB*: 25, 36-38).

Interestingly, Abdullahi began to strike at 'ancient' privileges of district and village heads, further emphasizing his independence from them. For example, Harris provided him with a perfect 'human rights' issue. The chief of Gabbas had been using forced labor on his personal lands. In some cases he appears to have promised, but not given, payment. Abdullahi investigated the matter and righted it. In the process, Abdullahi and Harris impressed upon headmen the fact that laborers should be paid and commoners left alone to farm their own lands (*YDB*: 25-26).

In addition to asserting Abdullahi's control of headmen and his independence of them, the incident also underscored Abdullahi's commitment to the encouragement of commodity production and government control of that production. Not only did the government appreciably tighten control on the local market (*YDB*: 66-67) but it used a bean lorry to monopolize all grain trade with the South (*YDB*: 48 and passing), a lorry still in operation in the 1970s. The British presence made it appreciably easier to extend central power into rural areas, as the increasing sway of Muslim judges illustrates (*YDB*: 48).

Abdullahi was a past master at using colonial reality to extend his claims. The *Day Book* provides numerous illustrations of his skill but
none, perhaps, better than his handling of a threatened emigration of Shanga Hune. To lose the last remaining remnant of Hune would be a mockery of his claims to the Hune now in Kontagora. Abdullahi quickly discovered that the Hune were being lured into Kontagora by the promise of lower taxes. Since taxes in the area were 'uniform' he suspected and proved foul play. An unscrupulous tax collector in Kontagora was charging lower taxes because he was pocketing the returns. Abdullahi used the colonial system to prevent the practice and keep 'his' Hune in Shanga (YDB: 80-81).

In turn, Abdullahi could not allow even a suspicion to exist regarding his efforts to recover the 'lost' Hune. Therefore, when two conspirators appealed for his aid in overthrowing village heads in Kontagora in exchange for a promise to support his claims, Abdullahi arrested the leader and reported the matter immediately to Harris (YDB:225-226). Respect for the internal integrity of the various emirates assured Abdullahi of administrative support for his own emirate's integrity and aid in recovering its lost portions.

Therefore, it is understandable that whenever anyone sought to tamper with its integrity, Abdullahi would react strongly as the following passage from the Day Book demonstrates:

Will you please inform the Chief of Bussa to stop getting into my affairs and the people of my Emirate? He is always sending C.I.D.'s (police detectives) to the people of Ngaski and those of Kwanji town. I have never sent a person to his town without his notice. I was annoyed with what he did the day before yesterday. I heard that he sent a boat to Yelwa secretly to take somebody called Azaru who comes from Yelwa. He sent Mallam Mayahi and Isa; they were his messengers. Isa then said he can't go anywhere without a prison approval from me. He then came and told me of what the chief of Bussa asked them to do. I asked them to inform the other man, Mayahi, to go back to Bussa, and he, Isa, not to return (YDB: 134-135).

Of course, the Emir of Bussa tried to retaliate but Abdullahi easily countered his attempt to lure some of Yauri's people across the Niger (YDB: 136).

Few emirs, indeed, could match Yauri's emir in playing the colonial game, for Abdullahi carefully worked at shaping the perception of British administrators. The highest praise, for example that Sharwood-Smith, a resident of Sokoto, can offer Tukrur, Abdullahi's son and
successor, is to state that he looks like his father, and, therefore, presumably will act like him (Sharwood-Smith, 1969:74).

Abdullahi used a variety of means to guide colonial perceptions. One tactic was to use a variety of Western status symbols, thereby enhancing his reputation as a progressive emir. For example, he used Western tailors, a Ford automobile, check books, movies, Yoruba music and a Victrola, a typewriter, cigarettes by the packet, the installment plan, Western shoes, a mattress, and numerous other 'modern' devices and artifacts (YDB: 137, for example). Abdullahi's ease with Western gadgets seems to have flattered Harris and his successors and put them at ease in their dealings with him.

In fact, it is clear from the Day Book that Harris began to rely increasingly on Abdullahi's advice and interpretation of Yauri's local life, history, and traditions. Harris's interest in anthropology provided Abdullahi with a prime opportunity to press his view of Yauri's historical and socio-cultural reality.

Harris provided Abdullahi with numerous opportunities for interpreting traditional relationships. Simply listing a few examples illustrates the range of subjects which Harris saw through Abdullahi's eyes: the reigns of each emir and major events during each reign; the beliefs of each emir; the reigns of 'Kambarawa, Shangawa, and Dukawa', including their origin; pre-civil war life and customs; the role of Islam in Yauri's life; the role of Yauri's 'original rulers, the Gungawa' (YDB: 64-66); Islamic law and marriage (68-70, 77-80, 163 ff); Hausa genealogy and class beliefs (112); the history of relationships between Yauri and Kontagora (113); and numerous other topics, each of which could be a case study. Indeed Harris often did write articles based on Abdullahi's information.

The manner in which Harris and Abdullahi worked together to control the Cattle Fulani (Filanin Daji) is a prototype of the extension of traditional powers during the colonial period, especially when their extension coincided with furthering British interests. A careful reading of The Yauri Day Book supports Mahdi Adamu's (1968) contention that the government of Yauri had not controlled the movements of the Filanin Daji for some time. The Day Book documents a very careful campaign to establish Yauri's rights in levying a cattle tax (jangali) controlling escape routes, compelling rinderpest control, collecting tax receipts, directing the return of stolen cattle, and other similar matters. It is clear that Abdullahi began to use the modern situation in order to extend his traditional powers. Not only were lists of cattle in villages and towns kept up to
date but receipts were carefully checked and cross-checked with neighboring areas.

Abdullahi's complaint on September 5, 1928, illustrates the use he made of British aid to extend his powers. In that complaint, Abdullahi charges the Fulani with hiding their cattle and lying about their numbers. Police were sent with receipt books and the power to countermand the orders of village heads in the matter. Fines against those who lied were to be levied at twice the usual rate per cattle, 4 shillings instead of 2 shillings. By 1931, he was confidently correcting Harris's replacement regarding the appropriate taxes and measures to use in dealing with the Fulani, actions in conformity with Smith's hypothesis (1970:21) that a strong emir generally dominated new officers.

Finally, some attention must be given Abdullahi's strengthening of the Reshe-Hausa alliance. Certainly, the British had made it clear that they admired the commercial Reshe. Failure to recognize that fact and behave accordingly had cost Aliyu the throne. Abdullahi's recognition of that reality, one in conformity with Jerabawa strategy, strengthened his power. The numerically inferior Hausa had replaced Reshe rulers but had forged an alliance with the Reshe, cemented through recruitment of members into the Hausa ethnic group from among their members (Salamone, 1974a:293).

Abdullahi was aware of the importance of this link and its double value to him as a source of allies and a means for maintaining British favor. He quite clearly warned Harris that any increase in taxation of the people of Gungu, the Reshe, would lead to their emigration from the Emirate, a threat that had lead to Clarke's and Aliyu's downfall (YDB: 208-209). Reshe commercial and horticultural enterprise was too precious to lose, their alliance too valuable to risk. The government, understandably, did not impose any further tax on them.

Lest it be concluded that the relationship between administrative officer and emir was a simple one, the case of Abdullahi's failure to secure quality education in Yauri should be presented. The emir's efforts flew in the face of conventional wisdom. That wisdom held that Muslim rulers were implacably opposed to modern education. The reality, however, was rather more subtle. There is, of course, no inherent conflict between Islam and modern education. Some, but not all, emirs opposed the fact that missionaries were the primary carriers of Western education to the North (Ubah, 1976:352; Omatsaye, 1981). Ubah (1976:363) is even of the opinion that the emirs
who resisted education would not have strongly resisted mission schools if the administration had not been so timid. In Harris’ case, however, there was no question of timidity; his pressure was brought to bear against education. Because it threatened the very bases of British colonial ideology, Harris sought to check Abdullahi's genuine commitment to education. Early education at the provincial school in Kano had instilled a life-long love for Western education and its developmental values. Teaching at Birnin Kebbi had only served to increase his conviction. As emir he sought to implement his commitment to education. Abdullahi grasped the truth that modern education was the path to success in the colonial and post-colonial world. In fact, he was acutely aware that it was the combination of modern education and a valid claim to traditional legitimacy that had led to his own success. It was that same combination that enabled him to perceive that lack of modern education was the single most important reason for the differential development of North and South. However, the inherent logic of indirect rule militated against Abdullahi’s dream, for that logic held that there must be local financial support for all local governmental functions, including schools. Moreover, the 'innate' hatred between missionaries and Muslim emirs meant that mission schools could not be tolerated (Graham, 1966:167-168). The educational consequences for Yauri were inevitable. On the brink of independence an emirate noted for its progressive leadership found itself in 1955 with only four schools, fifteen classrooms and 450 students, less than one percent of the school age population. Most of its teachers were Igbo or Yoruba.

There are logical limits to the social construction of reality. It was often necessary for Abdullahi to acquiesce in matters impinging on the ideological and economic essence of indirect rule. Thus, taxes were collected even where no traditional bases were found, and yearnings for a modern educational system were softened, lest Abdullahi interfere overmuch with colonial conceptions of proper Islamic belief (for similar processes see Dorward, 1974; Salamone 1974a, 1978, 1980; Markovitz, 1970; Busia, 1968; Gartrell, 1983).

Conclusion

Silverman (1973) has noted that traditional historical and institutional approaches to understanding dependency in developing countries fail to get at the essence of the problem because they fail to take note of important micro-processes. Current practices and problems in the former colonial dependencies can best be understood through combining traditional anthropological approaches with others which
direct analytical attention to negotiated versions of colonial reality. Negotiated reality, moreover, was a constantly changing one. Herskovits' (1937) seminal concept of syncretism, with its political as well as religious applications, offers insight into the process whereby subordinate members of colonial society successfully reshaped the perceptions of their rulers and, in turn, offered traditional rulers opportunities to perpetuate and expand their power in the colonial and post-colonial state. Old symbols and values, after all, do not simply lurk behind Christian saints, they also hide in the shadows of Marx and Jefferson.

The social construction of Yauri's colonial reality offers insights and parallels with similar large scale processes. The same basic colonial ideology prevailed in Yauri as in other sections of the North. Indeed, colonial descriptions of the 'truculent Dukawa' of Yauri are virtually interchangeable with those of the 'truculent Tiv'. Since the traditional Hausa rulers of Yauri appeared unable to 'civilize' the Dukawa, the British recruited the 'more-evolved' Fulani for the purpose. When Aliyu failed, through interfering with the commercial Reshe, the British discovered the 'evolutionary potential' of indigenous institutions as they had also done in Tivland.

Although such colonial adaptibility was, of course, pragmatic, it was not simply another case of 'muddling through'. The colonial administrators involved justified their adjustment with reference to a colonial ideology. That evolutionary ideology was, in fact, flexible but it was not totally malleable. As Yauri's experiences illustrate, it was not merely a cynical justification for pragmatic action. When it could not be reinterpreted or adjusted, it forced rigid and logical compliance. Thus, in spite of Abdullahi's desires, Yauri's educational system did not progress as he wished, for such progress clashed with a colonial ideology that defined reality differently.

Modern education in the colonial ideology meant mission education. But mission education was to blame for all the ills which educated 'natives' displayed. The true road to civilization was to be found in the promotion of commerce. Any education that promoted the encouragement of industry and character would be in conformity with Lugard's aims (Lugard, 1925: 3, 9, 11-12). Any action, then, that promoted the development of commerce was in itself promoting evolution of 'the native'.

The switch from Aliyu to Abdullahi was not the result of a change of heart. Rather, it was a logical ideological consequence. Aliyu had angered the most commercial ethnic group in Yauri, causing them to
threaten emigration. Abdullahi’s accession to the throne prompted commerce, and thus, ‘civilization’.

*The Yauri Day Book* presents an example of the process through which traditional rulers advanced their own interests. That process included a search for a charter of legitimacy that fit the evolutionary scheme inherent in British ideology. Abdullahi subtly and persistently pressed his claims to powers over neighboring lands and peoples while consolidating and expanding those powers over Yauri and its various ethnic groups. When those interests coincided with perceived British interests, Abdullahi was likely to succeed. To increase his chances for success, as *The Day Book* records, Abdullahi made insightful use of class symbols and behavior, such as his acceptance of Western gadgets.

Part of his symbolic behavior required intellectual conformity with British interests. These interests often coincided with those of traditional rulers. Specifically, in Yauri they included capturing the peasantry, a Reshe-Hausa alliance, Reshe ethnic and class identity change, and categorizing and taxing Fulani. Abdullahi shrewdly presented his accounts in a manner appropriate for the proper interpretation of reality in conformity with joint interests. In most cases an intelligent ruler like Abdullahi was able to work within the broad constraints of colonial ideology and reinterpret social reality in ways that actually strengthened his power. Understanding processes that contributed to the strengthening of traditional rulers’ power, of course, has profound implications for understanding current political problems and processes in Nigeria.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COLONIAL REALITY
Frank A. Salmone

References

ADAMU, Mahdi

BALOGUN, Saka Adegbite

CROWDER, Michael
1964 "Indirect rule-French and British Style". Africa 34:197-207.

DORWARD, David C.

DUFF, E.C.

EVANS-Pritchard, E.E.

GARTKE, Beverly

GRAHAM, S.F.

GREENBERG, Joseph

GUNN, Harold and Francis Conant

HARRIS, P.G.
1930 "Notes on Yauri (Sokoto Province)". Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 60:283-334.

Herskovits, Melville

HEUSSLER, Robert

HYDEN, Goran

LUGARD, Lord Frederick

MARKOVITZ, I.L. (ed.)

NICHOLSON, I.F.

OMATSEYE, J.N.
RODER, Wolf

SALAMONE, Frank A.
1974b "The role of the social welfare worker". Africanus 33-51.
1975 "Becoming Hausa". Africa 45:401-424.

SHARWOOD-SMITH, Sir Bryan

SILVERMAN, M.

SMITH, John

UBAH, C.N.

Archival Material

All of the archival material in this section is located in the Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna, and was consulted there. The material consists of reports to the secretary of the Northern provinces from administrative officers, petitions, collections of opinions and commentaries on laws, studies and histories, letters on administrative matters, and various other topics of interest to the administration between 1902 and 1925. The sessional papers are available in the British Library, London.

Emir of Yelwa
Complaint Against Attitude of, by the Gungawa Rivers Tribe. NANK:Sok Prof/150p/1918.

Emir of Yauri
Aliyu Deposited. NANK:Sok Profc.A.

Harries, P.G.
History of Yauri. NANK:SNP17K 7407, vol.II.
Iri and Duku Districts. NANK:SNP/145p/1913.

Kontagora Province

Kontagora Province
Laws and Customs, Notes on. NANK:Kon Prof 5314/1907.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COLONIAL REALITY
Frank A. Salmone

- Letter from A.D.O. vC Yelwa to resident Kontagora Province, October 6, 1917. NANK:SNP17K6099, vol. III.
- Letter from E.C. Duff, resident Kontagora, to secretary Northern provinces, Kaduna, April 10, 1918. NANK:Sok Prof150/1918.
- Sessional paper of 1903 SPR Mic B. 52 25 969 37/52 5, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1902.

Although not cited in this article, Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1922) has influenced the course of its argument: much of it is a response to that work. Similarly, *The Yauri Day Book*, found in no archives of which I am aware, does not appear in the bibliography, but has shaped the argument of my paper. (I have been recently informed that Rhodes House, Oxford, now has a copy of the *Day Book*.)