
Professor I. William Zartman's The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong (Princeton, 1971) is one of a series of Studies in Peaceful Change from the Center for International Studies at New York University. It attempts a detailed account with analyses of trade and aid negotiations primarily during the 1960's between groupings of newly independent African states and European states moving towards European community. These negotiations eminently merit study and it is to Professor Zartman's credit that he undertook it and did so dispassionately.

Unfortunately, the effort is seriously flawed. The title's promise of political analysis is unfulfilled. Because Professor Zartman focuses narrowly on a wealth of negotiating data, he neglects the historical context of African liberation and the tumult of international politics in the '60's. His thesis is that "small states do in fact have a good deal of power over more powerful states, but . . . this power must be based outside the narrow range of elements commonly subsumed under the labels 'strong' and 'weak.'" (5-6) He suggests in conclusion that weak states do have important power but solely through procedural means. They can "provoke an encounter" and thereby "influence agendas"; they can "put forward their needs . . . [which] become a challenge, a moral pang of practical dimensions that is quite different from the humanitarian heartburn of the past century"; and "weak states have the power to agree, which means the power to gratify both in the psychological sense and the sense of bringing into being the newly allocated pie." (227-228) But when Professor Zartman shows the results of the negotiations to be insubstantial for the Africans, one is forced to conclude that the power of the weak is "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." It is a beggar's bowl. "The context is the positive-sum negotiation. When there is a fixed pie to be redistributed, the weak are bound to lose. It is always in their interest to seek a non-zero-sum terrain for negotiations, where even if they get less than they think they deserve, they at least get something more than they had in the beginning." (227)
Power reveals itself in substantive results, not in simple procedural ability to gain the floor. Professor Adam Curle comments on the sad shape of the weak in UNCTAD negotiations:

[R]elations between the rich and the poor countries . . . seem to me to be, in general, unbalanced in the sense that the rich have the power (primarily economic, but backed by military power should the need arise) to impose economic and political conditions on the poor. That the latter have little redress is shown by the failure of the rest of the world to implement the policies advocated at meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Curle, Making Peace 7 (London, 1971)

Professor Zartman himself notes this dilemma when he reports that during a meeting in May of 1969 "President Diori presented a protesting statement in the name of the Eighteen [African Associates] in which he pointed out that Association was a political commitment in the eyes of the Africans but the Europeans were treating it as a simple economic and commercial arrangement." (193) By avoiding the African perspective, neocolonialism is never confronted nor is the linked problem of implementation addressed clearly. Professor Zartman's "objectivity" does not admit clearly relevant political issues.

Professor Zartman introduces his subject with a background review paying special attention to the Treaty of Rome (March 25, 1957) which was part of the European Economic Community negotiations among the Six: France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. His introductory discussion pays scant attention to the developing and soon-to-be-independent African states. Between the introductory background and the closing overview chapter on negotiations in general are four "case studies" which form the bulk of the book.

Each case study employs a two-part formulation: negotiation details followed by an analysis. In the negotiations sections chronology frequently is hard to follow and no summary charts are provided. Data and demands confront the reader with unrelenting monotony and sameness. No effort is made to indicate relative importance. Furthermore, Professor Zartman's writing is totally devoid of humor, summation, and drama. Although he has been judicious in his use of footnotes, he unfortunately
has fallen into a 3 x 5 file card trap. It is as if computers were negotiating rather than people with personalities and positions subject to political winds from home or from the international arena. Unhappily, there is no liveliness to energize the case studies; the reader is not invited to participate.

The first case study, "Negotiating the Yaoundé Convention," is the most confusing of the four presentations. As Professor Zartman himself notes,

[1]t would be a Procrustean judgment to evaluate the working of the Yaoundé institutions by some criterion of negotiations. It has been seen in detail and in analysis that little negotiation was involved. Yet the institutions worked well, in that they accomplished their purposes: they were the locus of an effective discussion about loose ends and current operations during the period of the Convention, and they helped set the stage for negotiations on the new agreement. In doing so, they assured that the next convention [discussed in "The Euroafrican Institutions" chapter] would be a refinement of Yaoundé, rather than a quantum jump into development. That was one form of realism, whatever the price. (199)

The Yaoundé negotiations were between the EEC Six and the Eighteen, all former colonies or territories of the Six. That Professor Zartman omits any clear listing of the Eighteen illustrates a major problem in his four case studies. He constantly assumes too much from the reader. His "Negotiations" section of the chapter presents in exhausting detail various demands and responses of the bargaining parties. Since the Six offered a uniform front which had been worked out beforehand with no small amount of friction, their negotiating position is easier to present than is that of the Eighteen who remain rather shadowy figures. With such a large number of nations involved, one would think that individual participants would at times speak cogently, that bargains might be struck, and that at least some on-stage activity would be reportable and significant. Although the Convention was signed, Professor Zartman's account reads as if agreement was reached after exchange of hundreds of memoranda. Further, the politics ["the means (power) and the ends (stakes in influencing behavior)"
(x)] of the Yaoundé negotiations are barely touched on, perhaps because "behavior" is to be inferred from data. Having no power, the Eighteen were at the mercy of the Six which worked out the details of agreement. "Rather than the deductive process of the Lagos negotiations, the Yaoundé set took on an inductive form. Thus, rather than agreement on principles or compromise over differences, there was often only an understanding on details that included no reference -- or even permitted conflicting reference -- to the underlying principle." (74) In addition to reaching agreement on aid figures and on trade concessions, the Yaoundé Convention limited Association to the Eighteen "but it was opened to African third states through the Declaration of Intentions." (62)

As third states, Commonwealth Africa (Nigeria and East Africa) entered into negotiations on issues of trade concessions and preferences. Aid was not a topic of negotiation. Professor Zartman's case study of negotiations with Commonwealth Africa is more coherent than his Yaoundé presentation, especially in regard to the negotiations with Nigeria which concluded with the Lagos Treaty and preceded negotiations with East Africa. Nigeria, it appears, was in excellent negotiating position because it stood as a symbol of energetic, independent Africa which would be a legitimizing member of the Association. "The most crucial difference between the Yaoundé and Lagos negotiations was that the Eighteen were 'in' and were fighting for their life to stay in, whereas Nigeria was 'out' and would only want to come in if it gained more than it stood to lose." (112-113) East Africa, however, approached negotiations with less power -- Nigeria was more important in the view of the Association -- and less skill than Nigeria. Professor Zartman's discussion of the East African negotiations consequently suffers in clarity and becomes more of a listing of data similar to the Yaoundé case study. The strongest negotiating position was presented by Commonwealth Africa. It "differed strongly from the Maghreb negotiations, where pressure to renew talks quickly and to persuade the participants of the value of Association were important activities of the African applicants, and from the Yaoundé negotiations, where across-the-table communication was used to justify and question major changes in positions as well as lesser points of bargaining." (108-109)

Negotiations with North Africa, Professor Zartman's third case
study, differed substantially from the other African negotiations primarily because Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian products are Mediterranean and thus directly competitive with French and Italian agriculture. While there was general agreement that the Maghreb should be integrated into the trade area, negotiations were stalled and impeded by the inability of the three countries to agree among themselves. This resulted in separate negotiations being conducted between the EEC Six and each of the three North African states which suffered from the proportionally diminished strength that comes from disunity. At the close of the case study time period, no firm agreements had been reached.

"The Euroafrican Institutions" is essentially a sequential case study to those of negotiations at Yaoundé and Lagos. Whereas the events of the initial negotiations took place in the early 1960's, this second round came at the end of the decade. By that time, the African nations were not so newly independent and a third world political position was emerging. Professor Zartman gives some attention to this new African strength, but he does little more than glance over the troublesome questions of African economic development and Western economic penetration. Equally important in the context of European-African economic and political relationships at the end of the 1960's was Europe's struggle with its own integration measures for which Africans were outsiders with potentially conflicting interests and promises. In sum, the Euroafrican institutions so painfully developed during the '60's appear from Professor Zartman's account to be withering, although such a conclusion must be extrapolated by the reader since no effort is made to discuss the difficulties and potential of implementing even the modest agreements reached.

One is tempted to cite back to Professor Zartman his concluding chapter on "Negotiations in General" in which he discusses new approaches to the study of negotiations. He states that "[t]he main question to answer in a comprehensive analysis of negotiation, it seems, should be: How are divergent viewpoints combined to produce a common agreement?" (206) In Professor Zartman's view, behavioral principles and power principles are both inadequate. The one is too psychological, the other too "success" oriented. Primary focus on process rather than on results may be preferable, he suggests. "Convergence analysis can be combined with an analysis of alternative limitation to bring out substantive and power considerations; alone, however,
convergence analysis plays down the substantive arguments in order to bring out procedure and so may give a false impression of the negotiation process." (212) While Professor Zartman has attempted such an analysis, he has generally failed. Certainly his selection of the case study approach was warranted, for it offers a fine vehicle for developing answers to the overriding question "how?" Yet, Professor Zartman's inability to shift smoothly from detail to generality leaves one un instructed and unable to deduce any theory "to indicate that under certain conditions, a certain outcome is likely to occur for certain reasons." (218) Perhaps this is just as well, for it would be most disheartening to conclude, as one must from Professor Zartman's study, that African states cannot be helped by the West to develop economically without sacrificing political independence to predatory neocolonialism.

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